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“Enemy Soldiers” and “Ball Mates”:
Intra-Imperial Football and Identity Politics in Interwar Northeast Asia
E. Taylor Atkins
Northern Illinois University
In the mid-1930s a string of Korean successes in athletic events tested colonial relations with Japan.
The best known of these occurred at the 11th Olympiad in Berlin in 1936, where marathoners Son
Ki-jŏng 孫基禎 (1912-2002) and Nam Sŭng-nyong 南昇龍 (1912-2001) took gold and bronze
medals, respectively. Japanese were angered when Korean newspaper editors erased the rising sun
emblem from Son’s jersey in a photograph of the medal ceremony and, according to an official
report, his victory “was seized as a sign of the superiority of the Korean race.”1
Yet it was in another sport that Koreans consistently displayed “superiority”: association
football (soccer). In the year before Son and Nam’s medal wins, Koreans won two major football
tournaments that were supposed to determine which teams would represent imperial Japan in
Berlin. At the Greater Japan Football Association (JFA) Emperor’s Cup tournament, the first to
include squads from external territories within the Japanese Empire, the Kyŏngsŏng (Seoul)
Football Club (KFC) trounced Japan’s strongest side, Tokyo Science and Literature (Bunri)
University, 6-1. In November that same year, KFC prevailed again at the Meiji Shrine Games,
shutting out Keiō University’s BRB (Blue, Red & Blue) alumni team, 2-0.
Irritated yet impressed, JFA officials initially announced they would recruit seven Korean
players (for a roster of eighteen) for the Olympic team. Koreans were infuriated when JFA
eventually recruited only two, Kim Yŏng-gŭn 金永根 (1908-70) and Kim Yong-sik 金容植
(1910-85). In the end only Kim Yong-sik participated, sharing with the marathoners what was both
an honor and an indignity: representing their colonial oppressor in the world’s most prestigious
sporting event.
There are two schools of thought about the impact of international football competition on
relations between countries. Many enthusiasts fervently exalt football as a “sport with no borders”
that fosters international amity.2 “Football gives unparalleled opportunities for the projection of
national identity on the global stage, which, additionally, serves to illuminate the whole stage.”3
Believing football “create[s] understanding between different peoples,” in 2001 Swedish MP Lars
Gustafsson nominated football for the Nobel Peace Prize.4
Yet international competition of course also intensifies nationalist sentiment. Football is “a
central domain in which nation-related rituals including intense collective emotions are
observable.” These emotions are “crucial” to the “heightened affective arousal” that fosters
1

Tong-a ilbo (hereafter TAI) August 13, 1936: 2; and Annual Report on the Administration of Chosen (1936-37)
(Keijō: Government-General of Chōsen, 1937), 177.
2
Nasu Shō 那須翔 (1924-2014), chairman of JAWOC, quoted in exhibit at Japan Football Museum, Tokyo.
3
Peter Hough, “‘Make Goals Not War’: The Contribution of Football to World Peace,” International Journal
of the History of Sport (hereafter IJHS) 25.10 (September 2008): 1287.
4
Lars Gustafsson quoted in Peter Hough, “‘Make Goals Not War’: The Contribution of Football to World
Peace,” IJHS 25.10 (September 2008): 1287; Simon Kuper, “Playing for Peace,” The Guardian January 28,
2001, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2001/jan/28/europeanfootball.sport.
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“cognitive and affective” attachments to national communities. 5 If football success fortifies
national pride, it concurrently “represent[s] an expression of aggression toward one’s rivals,
toward representatives of other countries.”6 George Orwell famously characterized international
football as a “species of fighting” and “war minus the shooting.”7
Few scholars have studied the impact of football on intra-imperial relations, when one
competitor is a “nation” and the other technically is not. Intra-imperial competition was admittedly
rare, since the possibility of colonizers losing to colonized peoples endangered the racial
hierarchies on which imperialism was based. Imperial powers encouraged the spread of modern
sports throughout the colonial world “as one means of inculcating respect for the values of time,
discipline and authority within the minds and spirits of the colonised.”8 But engaging colonial
subjects in direct athletic competition made the colonizer vulnerable to exposure of his weakness:
in every situation and setting, his mastery must be confirmed.
Moreover, native victories (or even good showings) inspired collective celebrations easily
construed as nationalist expressions. In 1911 when the Bengali Mohun Bagan FC, playing
barefooted, defeated the British Army’s Yorkshire Regiment team, 2-1, the English press noted
that the victory “had brought in its wake a sense of universal joy” that crossed caste and communal
barriers.9 Scholars have shown that even in the absence of direct competition against colonizers,
football created colonial communities of national self-assertion and resistance in places as diverse
as Egypt, Indonesia, Zanzibar, and Vietnam. Rather than making colonized people more
disciplined and docile, football gave them a mechanism for defiance.10
Nowhere was intra-imperial football competition more routine than in Northeast Asia,
between imperial Japan and colonial Korea. Like other imperial powers, Japanese used sport
strategically to inculcate discipline, respect for rules, and moral development in its formal colonies,
but colonial subjects turned competitive sport into a “medium of national resistance,” “the only
means with which [they] could defeat Japan.” 11 This imbued each accomplishment with deep
5

Sven Ismer, “Embodying the Nation: Football, Emotions and the Construction of Collective Identity,”
Nationalities Papers 39.4 (July 2011): 548, 560-561.
6
Liubov’ Borusiak, “Soccer as a Catalyst for Patriotism,” Russian Social Science Review 51.1 (JanuaryFebruary 2010): 74.
7
George Orwell, “Such, Such Were the Joys …” Partisan Review 19.5 (September-October 1952): 535; and
George Orwell, “The Sporting Spirit,” Tribune December 14, 1945, available at The Orwell Foundation,
https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/thesporting-spirit/. See Peter J. Beck, “‘War Minus the Shooting’: George Orwell on International Sport and
the Olympics,” Sport in History 33.1 (2013): 72-94.
8
Laura Fair, “Kickin’ It: Leisure, Politics and Football in Colonial Zanzibar, 1900-1950s,” Africa: Journal of
the International African Institute 67.2 (1997): 224.
9
Boria Majumdar, “The Vernacular in Sports History,” IJHS 20.1 (March 2003): 117-118.
10
Shaun Lopez, “Football as National Allegory: Al-Ahram and the Olympics in 1920s Egypt,” History
Compass (January 2009): 282-305; Patrick Hutchison, “Breaking Boundaries: Football and Colonialism in the
British
Empire,”
Inquiries
Journal/Student
Pulse,
1.11
(2009),
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/64/breaking-boundaries-football-and-colonialism-in-thebritish-empire; Agathe Larcher-Goscha, “Du Football au Vietnam (1905-1949): colonialism, culture sportive
et sociabilités en jeux,” Outre-Mers: Revue d’Histoire 97.2 (2009): 61-89; Freek Colombijn, “The Politics of
Indonesian Football,” Archipel 59 (2000): 171-200.
11
Chien-Yu Lin and Ping-Chao Lee, “Sport as a Medium of National Resistance: Politics and Baseball in
Taiwan During Japanese Colonialism,” IJHS 24.3 (March 2007): 319-337. See also Gwang Ok, “The Political
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meaning for undermining imperial discourses of Japanese superiority—and unlike other forms of
popular culture, by its very nature sport was not censorable.
JFA’s incorporation of Korea as a “regional” affiliate meant that intra-imperial competition
was more frequent and routine than in other empires. This administrative structure made JFA an
embodiment of the official naisen ittai (“Japan and Korea—one body”) policy. Officially
announced in September 1938, naisen ittai had in fact been a longstanding policy objective
intended to neutralize lingering vestiges of Korean cultural independence and aspirations for
sovereignty. Though no doubt skeptical of Japanese intentions, some Koreans hoped to use naisen
ittai to their advantage, to promote “mutual understanding and cooperation.”12
A handful of scholars and journalists have written accounts of Japan-Korea football
relations, with varying degrees of analytical rigor.13 The best of these, by Ōshima Hiroshi and Seok
Lee, provide contextualized and nuanced perspectives, transcending the nationalist frameworks of
other narratives. 14 Relying extensively on oral histories among players from both countries,
Ōshima demonstrates how deeply intertwined the football communities of colony and metropole
were throughout the 1930s. Lee focuses primarily on internal controversies and regional rivalries
in the Korean football community in the lead-up to the 1936 Olympics.15 By contrast, Takenouchi
Kōsuke and Kagawa Hiroshi’s breathless celebration of Japan’s “miraculous” Olympic victory
over Sweden entirely omits the tense colonial politics that preceded it.16
Adopting Ōshima and Lee’s post-nationalist perspectives, here I incorporate additional
sources to take a longer view of Japan-Korea football relations, and further elaborate on their
arguments with particular reference to colonial relations generally and naisen ittai integration
specifically. I argue that although technically intra-imperial (glossed as “regional”) competition
between imperial Japan and colonial Korea certainly provided ample opportunities for nationalist
expression—indeed, in interwar Northeast Asia footballers were called “soldiers” (gun/kun) and
opponents “enemies” (teki/chŏk)—it also exemplified what naisen ittai was supposed to look like.

Significance of Sport: An Asian Case Study—Sport, Japanese Colonial Policy and Korean National
Resistance, 1910-1945,” IJHS 22.4 (2005): 649-670; Wei-Cheng Chiu, Dong-Jhy Hwang, and Alan Bairner,
“In the Shadow of National Glory: Taiwan Aboriginal Baseball in the Politics of Identity,” IJHS 31.3 (2014):
347-362; Karam Lee and Gwang Ok, “A War Without Weapons: Rugby, Korean Resistance, and Japanese
Colonialism, 1910-1945,” IJHS 33.5 (July 2015): 1-12; John Harney, “Youth Baseball and Colonial Identity in
Taiwan, 1920-1968,” NINE: A Journal of Baseball History and Culture 22.1 (Fall 2013): 20-43; and J.A. Mangan,
Kyongho Park, and Gwang Ok, “Japanese Imperial Sport as Failed Cultural Conditioning: Korean
‘Recalcitrance,’” in J.A. Mangan, et al., Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport in East Asia (New York.
Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 43-69.
12
Kang Ch’ang-ki, Naisen ittai ron (Tokyo: Kokumin Hyōronsha, 1939), 3.
13
See Kō Tateo, Shirazaru Nikkan sakkā gekitō shi (Tokyo: Kōzaidō Shuppan, 1998); Pak Kyŏng-ho and Kim
Tok-ki, Nihon wa teki, JAPAN wa tomo, trans. Morioka Ryū (Tokyo: Ōkura Shuppan, 2002); Kang Hŭi-bong,
Nikkan sakkā gekitō shi (Tokyo: Gakken Bunko, 2002).
14
Ōshima Hiroshi, Nikkan kikkuofu densetsu (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihon Sha, 1996); and Seok Lee, “Becoming
a Member of the Japanese National Football Team as a Korean: The 1936 Berlin Olympic Trials and Colonial
Korea,” in Sport in Korea: History, Development, Management, eds. Dae Hee Kwak, Yong Jae Ko, Inkyu Kang,
and Mark Rosentraub (London and New York. Routledge, 2017), 31-44.
15
Jong Sung Lee, A History of Football in North and South Korea c. 1910-2002 (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016) also
devotes significant attention to regional rivalries.
16
Takenouchi Kōsuke and Kagawa Hiroshi, Berurin no kiseki: Nihon sakkā no kirameki no isshun (Tokyo:
Tokyo Shinbun, 2015).
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Football was one area in which Koreans and Japanese could and did collaborate on terms
of relative parity. Korean supremacy in football earned Japanese respect and inclusion on the
Japanese national (Jp. daihyō; Kr. taep’yo) squad. Whatever their other disadvantages under
colonial occupation, in football Koreans were indomitable: Korean sides won 73% of the 139
matches for which I could find records (101 wins, 27 losses, 11 draws); and the total goal
differential was a staggering 364 (501 for Koreans to 137 for Japanese).17 If Korean footballers
were unable to secure political independence for their homeland, they most assuredly won a lovely
consolation prize: humiliation of their oppressors on the soccer pitch.
Yet with no independent national side of their own, Koreans wanted—indeed, felt
entitled—to represent Japan in international play; and Japanese needed Korean footballers to be
more competitive. Association football thus muddied national identities within both the metropole
and the colony. Rabid regional rivalries between the eastern Kansai and western Kantō in Japan,
and P’yŏngyang and Kyŏngsŏng in Korea, seriously compromised national cohesion and had a
significant impact on the process of forming the daihyō side that went to Berlin—in fact, brawls,
belligerently disputed calls, and exhortations from the stands to murder opponents were much
more common in matches between Koreans than against Japanese.
Furthermore, when representing Japan abroad, playing for Japanese universities and
company teams, or competing in JFA-sponsored regional tournaments, Korean footballers were
nominally “Japanese.” Like other colonial subjects, Korean footballers strategically invoked their
status as “children of the emperor” when it suited their purposes.18 Situationally, they occupied a
liminal, performance-based meritocracy (jitsuryoku no sekai), in which ethno-national animosities
were temporarily suspended, and they developed friendships with Japanese teammates who
respected them and with whom they shared passion for the sport. “When I was on the Japan daihyō
team,” Yi Yu-hyŏng 李裕灐 (1911-2003) insisted, “there was no discrimination.” 19 Athletes
shifted identities, objectives, and allegiances depending on circumstances, usually prioritizing
improved performance above all else.
Discrimination among players may have been minimal, but not always among JFA officials,
coaches, referees, and fans. My perspective here is not pollyannish: ethnic discrimination was rife
off the pitch and nationalist hostilities sharply evident in matches pitting Koreans against Japanese.
If not technically “international” matches, they carried the same symbolic weight. “You are not
just playing football,” one Korean coach reportedly told his squad before a match against Japan.
“You are fighting for the independence of the Korean people.”20 This fraught history of football
as an expression of Korean nationalism cast a broad shadow over all post-liberation matches
between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), as well as the 2002 FIFA World Cup tournament,
co-hosted by both countries in an unprecedented arrangement.

17

Compiled match results available at https://www.niu.edu/etatkins/_pdf/japan-korea-matches.pdf.
Kirsten Ziomek, Lost Histories: Recovering the Lives of Japan’s Colonial Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard
University Asia Center, 2019), 6, 256, 287.
19
Quoted in Ōshima, Nikkan, 89-90.
20
Quoted in Korea Sports Council, “The History of Korea Sports Council” (unpublished report, 1965), 167,
cited in Lee Jong-Young, “The Development of Football in Korea,” in Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup,
eds. John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter (London: Routledge: 2002), 78.
18
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Finally, association football also disrupted the center-periphery orientation of relations
between colony and metropole, as well as within each territory. If Korea was “one part” (ichibu),
“region” (chihō), or “periphery” (gaichi/gaibu) of Japan in spatial imaginations, Korean
dominance on the pitch arguably made it the center of Northeast Asian football. Internally,
P’yŏngyang and Kyŏngsŏng vied to a stalemate for status as the sport’s peninsular epicenter,
whereas in Japan, Kantō’s more established centrality was constantly contested on and off the
pitch by Kansai. Football thus embodied multiple identity struggles—national, regional, imperial,
personal, and professional—within interwar Northeast Asia.
The “Beautiful Game” in Northeast Asia
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) officially recognizes an East Asian
game (Ch. cuju; Jp. kemari; Kr. ch’ukku) played by elites in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam as
the “forebear of football.”21 The British brought the modern incarnation to East Asian treaty ports
in the latter half of the 1800s. Lieutenant-Commander Archibald Lucius Douglas (1842-1913) of
the Royal Navy and sailors under his command introduced cadets at the Imperial Japanese Naval
Academy to the game in 1873. Koreans first observed a football match among British commercial
sailors in 1882, when the HMS Flying Fish was at port in Inch’ŏn.
The arrival of football in Northeast Asia coincided with the rise of a Social Darwinistinflected athletics discourse, which linked the physical fitness of individual (male) citizen/subjects
to the health of the national body (pun intended). East Asian nationalist intellectuals repeatedly
stressed physical education and athletics as essential to modernity and national viability.
Combining the Anglo-American ideology of “muscular Christianity” and Confucian principles of
self-mastery, obedience, and stoicism, Japanese educators promoted sport as a mechanism for
character-building and moral development.22 Sport had instrumental value for fomenting emperorcentered nationalism, developing military prowess, instilling obedience and discipline, and
improving Japan’s racial stock. Korean advocates likewise repeatedly foregrounded sport’s
potential benefits to country and, implicitly, the recuperation of personal manliness and national
sovereignty. “Superior races win and inferior races lose,” a 1920 editorial bluntly asserted. “[I]n
Korea the present situation is one in which body and mind have weakened and declined. This is
because Koreans have lived an idle life and not taken care of their health, and thus been unable to
develop the life force of Heaven and Earth.”23
Modern sports (baseball, basketball, rugby, track and field, rowing, golf, tennis, volleyball,
gymnastics, swimming, and association football) had their respective advocates in Japan and
Korea, each declaring their favored sport best for accomplishing national objectives. In terms of
domestic popularity and media coverage, baseball was the clear favorite in Japan. However,
because association football was rapidly becoming the world’s most popular spectator sport, JFA
21

“History
of
Football—The
Origins”
(https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/thegame/index.html); and Vincent Haywood, “China’s 1936 Olympic Football Team: Eight of the Players
Were from Hong Kong,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch 48 (2008): 8-9.
22
Sugimoto Atsuo, “School Sport, Physical Education and the Development of Football Culture in Japan,”
in Football Goes East: Business, Culture and the People’s Game in China, Japan and South Korea, eds. Wolfram
Manzenreiter and John Horne (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2004), 102-116.
23
“Chosŏn Ch’eyukhoe e taeyahan,” TAI July 16, 1920: 1; quoted in J.A. Mangan and Ha Nam-gil,
“Confucianism, Imperialism, Nationalism: Modern Sport Ideology and Korean Culture,” in J.A. Mangan,
ed., Europe, Sport, World: Shaping Global Societies (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 69.
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officials worked hard to raise its profile, convinced that success in football confirmed the national
narrative of Japan’s progress toward “civilization” and cultural prominence in the modern world.
On the other hand, despite the presence of American missionaries and Japanese imperialists,
Koreans preferred football as their “national sport” (kukki). A 1941 Asahi article characterized
football as the “pride of the peninsula,” and Korean baseball as “torpid” (teichō).24 But aside from
some “friendlies” (Jp. shinzen shiai; Kr. ch’insŏn sihap) against Shanghai and Tianjin teams in the
1930s, Koreans did not technically engage in international play during the colonial period: playing
a Japanese side was regional competition.25
The game sank roots in the peninsula due to the efforts of private school students and
alumni, court translators, the YMCA, and Christian missionaries. 26 Missionaries believed that
football “carried within it a moral order based on the ethics of commitment and dedication, of team
spirit and the subjection of the individual to the demands of the group and of valour and personal
bravery,” qualities purportedly “lacking” in colonized populations.27 This dovetailed nicely with
the emphasis both Japanese and Koreans placed on moral education.
Persuading educators of football’s didactic value was therefore essential to its proliferation.
Tokyo Higher Normal School (now Tsukuba University) published football handbooks on the
game for physical education teachers, stressing the sport’s moral impact. Tsuboi Gendō 坪井玄道
(1852-1922), Japan’s first gymnastics teacher, wrote that football was an engrossing game whose
spiritual benefits surpassed even its corporeal ones. Cooperative team play “cultivates the spirit”
and enabled British and Americans to develop their “gentlemanly spirits” and “sturdy
physiques.”28
Korean Christian, Buddhist, and Ch’ŏndogyo religious institutions all promoted football
for moral instruction.29 Athletes were expected to be kunja (Ch. junzi, the masculine ideal of virtue,
self-mastery, and erudition) who conducted themselves with “great honor.”30 In a 1922 article in
the Korean intellectual journal Creation (Kaebyŏk), footballer Kim Wŏn-t’aek 金源泰 insisted
that soccer was the most “effective” and “reliable” game for developing both body and mind, as
well as a “cooperative spirit” (hyŏpdong chŏk chŏngsin). Redemption of the nation was contingent
on the recuperation of Korean manhood through athletics—particularly football—at a time when
Korean culture was disparaged as “civilian rather than military, and somewhat effeminate.”31
24

“Chōsen taiikukai no tenbō—hantō no hokori, shūkyū—yakyūkai wa teichō no ichizu,” Asahi shinbun
(hereafter AS) May 24, 1941: 6.
25
Kō, Shirazaru, 59-60; Kanō, “Sakkā,” 243-244.
26
Gwang Ok and Kyongho Park, “Cultural Evolution and Ideology in Korean Soccer: Sport and
Nationalism,” IJHS 31.3 (2014): 365-367; Lee, “Development,” 76-77; Kō, Shirazaru 49; Kang, Nikkan, 21.
27
J.A. Mangan, “Soccer as Moral Training: Missionary Intentions and Imperial Legacies,” IJHS 27.1-2 (2010):
421.
28
Tokyo Kōtō Shihan Gakkō Futtobōrubu, Assoshieshon futtobōru (Tokyo: Shōbidō,1903), n.p.; Tokyo Kōtō
Shihan Gakkō Kōyūkai Shūkyūbu, Futtobōru (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Tosho, 1908), n.p.
29
Jong Sung Lee, A History of Football in North and South Korea c. 1910-2002 (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016), 36.
30
Gwang Ok, The Transformation of Modern Korean Sport: Imperialism, Nationalism, Globalization (Elizabeth,
NJ: Hollym, 2007), 234; Lee, History, 71; Pak and Kim, Nihon, 79, 81.
31
Kim Wŏn-t’ae, “Sanai kŏdŭn p’ŭtbol ŭl ch’ara,” Kaebyŏk 5 (November 1922): 104-107; Jung Hwan Cheon,
“Bend It Like a Man of Chosun: Sports Nationalism and Colonial Modernity of 1936,” in The Korean Popular
Culture Reader, eds. Kyung Hyun Kim and Youngmin Choe (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 205-
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In the first half of the twentieth century, it was more common for East Asian nations to
send their strongest preexisting teams or national tournament champions to international
competitions (most prominently the Far Eastern Championship Games) than to field “pick-up”
(pikku appu, all-star) sides consisting of select players from clubs throughout the country.
Centralized governing bodies determined which clubs would represent from one event to the next.
As national associations became the norm internationally, Japanese followed suit with the
JFA on September 10, 1921, and joined FIFA in 1929. However, the Korean Sports Association
(1920-38) organized the All-Korea Football Tournament (1921-41) for high school, college, and
company teams on February 11-13, 1921, some nine months before the JFA’s first competition
took place (unfortunately, the championship match between Chung’ang High School and Paejae
Academy was suspended due to fierce disputes about the rules of the game and questionable
officiating).32
The Korea Football Association (1933-42, hereafter KFA) evolved from an earlier referees’
association founded in 1928. KFA did not have an independent FIFA affiliation until its postliberation incarnation in the ROK was established in 1948; nor did it participate as an independent
side in the Far Eastern Championship Games. KFA was one of seven regional affiliates alongside
those in the metropole.33 It existed primarily to organize and oversee intra-peninsular competition
and to determine which teams would represent the “region” in JFA tournaments.
Still, Koreans and Japanese approached their contests with the same motivation and
gravitas they brought to official international play. Rhetoric and administrative initiatives
incorporated the colony as “one part” or “region” of Japan, as Algeria was a French département.34
Yet the de facto alienation of Koreans as either foreigners or, at best, second-class Japanese
subjects gave football matches between the peninsula and the archipelago at least the flavor of
international competition. In the end, each was the other’s fiercest adversary, elevating passions
and inspiring their best play.35 “If we lose to Japan,” Korean players said, “we can’t go home.”36
Enemies Within
Municipal, scholastic, and regional rivalries are essential to any self-respecting football country.
Football teams in Japan’s eastern Kantō and western Kansai were acutely competitive with one
another, whereas in Korea a fervid rivalry developed between P’yŏngyang and Kyŏngsŏng in the
late 1920s. In both cases, football rivalries reflected deeper socio-cultural differences and
longstanding resentments between political centers and provincial peripheries. Moreover, they

206; Lee, History, 31-32; and Seok Lee, “Colonial Korea and the Olympic Games, 1910-1945,” Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, University of Pennsylvania, 2016, 8182. The literal translation of the Kaebyŏk article’s title is “if you are a child of the mountain, kick a football,”
but Cheon translates it as “if you are a man of Chosŏn, kick a football.”
32
Ōshima, Nikkan, 35-36; Lee, History, 38; Lee, “Becoming,” 36-37; Kang, Nikkan, 22; Ok, Transformation, 246.
33
Kantō, Kansai, Hokuriku, Hokkaidō, Chūgoku, Tōkai, and Chōsen.
34
Nayoung Aimee Kwon, Intimate Empire: Collaboration and Colonial Modernity in Korea & Japan (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2015), 155-156.
35
Kō, Shirazaru, 60; Ōshima, Nikkan, 121; Lee, History, 32.
36
Kō, Shirazaru, 54; Ōshima, Nikkan, 106; Kanō, “Sakkā, 243; Kang, Nikkan, 25; Sin Mu-kwan, Ilbon (Nihon)
wa raibaru ka—Kankoku no J rīgā 28 nin no honne (Tokyo: Pitch Communications, 2015).
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complicated and compromised the allegiances, motivations, and identities of Japanese and Korean
footballers.
Northwestern P’yongan province’s antipathy toward the Kyŏngsŏng capital region was
longstanding. For P’yŏngyang residents, football was a means to stick it to their nemesis to the
south. Factionalism in Korea’s hopelessly splintered nationalist movement also made football
clashes nastier: some key figures in the Kyŏngsŏng-centered Kiho and Sŏbuk (Northwest) political
factions were also involved in YMCA football.37 P’yŏngan province produced powerful teams
such as Muo FC, Sungsil Vocational School, P’yŏngyang Higher Regular School, and Hamhŭng
Smeltery that defeated Japanese sides in important competitions. Sungsil nurtured the talents of
the man whom many regard, along with Hong Kong’s Li Huitong 李惠堂 (1905-79), as East Asia’s
first “soccer genius,” Kim Yŏng-gŭn.38
Northwestern teams were known for wild, aggressive, physical play, whereas teams in
Kyŏngsŏng were considered more technically proficient and tactical.39 The colonial capital was
home to Paejae Higher Regular School, Posŏng Vocational School (now Korea University),
Kyŏngsin Middle School, Yŏnhŭi Vocational School (now Yŏnsei University), Keijō Imperial
University (now Seoul National University), and Chosŏn FC (formerly the Buddhist Youth
Association FC).
In 1929 and 1930 the Chosŏn ilbo newspaper sponsored a three-day Kyŏng-P’yŏng
Football Tournament pitting all-star teams from Kyŏngsŏng and P’yŏngyang against one another.
Bedlam ensued. “Players intentionally kicked their opponents and threw them to the ground while
the referees looked the other way. They were encouraged by shouts from the fans to ‘hit them,’
‘kick them,’ and ‘kill them.’” After a two-year suspension, the newly established KFA resurrected
the competition in 1933, organizing spring and autumn matches between the newly formed
P’yŏngyang FC and an all-star lineup from Kyŏngsŏng. Sadly, “violent incidents continued” and
after three years the Kyŏng-P’yŏng tournament was again canceled and did not resume until after
liberation in 1946.40
The Japanese parallel to the Kyŏng-P’yŏng competition was the East-West (Tōzai) College
Championship (1929-65), between the respective champions of the Kantō and Kansai college
leagues. Perhaps because it emphasized east-west competition (an organizing principle in sumō
and other sports), to many fans Tōzai was more important than JFA’s Emperor’s Cup tournaments
(1921-40). Kantō university teams such as Waseda, Keiō, and Tokyo Imperial dominated the
competition throughout the interwar and wartime periods. Kansai teams fared much better in the
Emperor’s Cup and national middle and high school tournaments. The region boasted two
powerhouse sides: Kōbe’s Mikage Normal School and Hiroshima’s renowned Rijō FC.41

37

Lee, History, 41, 43-45; Lee, “Becoming,” 35.
Pak and Kim, Nihon, 77-91; Ōshima, Nikkan, 70-71.
39
Ōshima, Nikkan, 50; Lee, History, 49-50.
40
Lee, History, 45-46; Pak and Kim, Nihon, 115-119; Lee, “Becoming,” 37-38.
41
Tanada Marin, Hyōgo-ken ni okeru a-shiki shūkyū no shiteki kenkyū (Kōbe: Kōbe Shōgyō Daigaku Keizai
Kenkyūjo, 1991).
38

9

Studies on Asia Vol. 6, Issue 1 (2021)

First Shots
Before Kyŏngsŏng FC’s 1935 Emperor’s Cup and Meiji Shrine Games triumphs, most matches
between Japanese and Korean sides were friendlies, with no trophies, titles, or prize monies at
stake (the exception was Korean participation in Japan’s national middle school tournament). In
April 1926 Ōsaka Soccer Club played two matches in Kyŏngsŏng, tying one, losing the other.42 In
October, the Asahi newspaper sponsored a tour by the “formidable” Chosŏn FC (CFC).43 The tour
portended a future of Korean dominance: over eleven grueling days CFC compiled five wins and
three draws. The Koreans “displayed overwhelming strength” and “excellent individual skills” in
its 2-1 win over Tokyo Normal, the cradle of Japanese football. “[I]f CFC has one defect,” Asahi’s
report stated, “it is that they have poor shooting accuracy. The fact that they finished with merely
two points despite all their chances proves that. Tokyo Normal took 31 goal kicks. This
demonstrates the recklessness of the CFC taking careless long shots.” 44 Reflecting on the
triumphant tour, CFC captain/center forward Hyŏn Chŏng-ju 玄正柱 (1899-1970) noted the
“scientific” training of Japanese opponents as something for Koreans to emulate and attributed
Korean victories to a “spirit that we had to win no matter what.”45
Occasional friendlies continued into the early 1930s, including an annual best-of-three
competition between Keijō and Kyūshū imperial universities. But the stakes rose when JFA
announced its intention to send a representative side to Berlin for the 1936 Olympics and to
audition “aspiring teams” at the 1935 Emperor’s Cup and Meiji Shrine Games. 46 The phrase
“aspiring teams” (“yashin aru” tīmu) was important, indicating that, per precedent, whole extant
squads rather than selected individuals were eligible to be sent to Berlin. JFA in fact rejected
KFA’s plan to send to Tokyo an all-star squad consisting of players from both Kyŏngsŏng and
P’yŏngyang. KFC beat its rival in a close 1-0 match to decide which side would represent the
colony.47
If most Koreans rejected the notion that they were part of Japan, Korean footballers
nonetheless evinced a situational change in attitude. Immediately, they not only aspired to
represent Japan but felt entitled by their prowess to do so. Since KFA was formally a regional
affiliate of JFA, technically Korean teams were no less eligible than any Japanese squad for the
coveted Olympic assignment. At the very least, they expected Koreans to comprise half of a select
Japan national side.48 The rhetoric of naisen ittai only strengthened their case. What better way to
demonstrate Japanese sincerity and Korean buy-in than for Koreans to represent Japan in
international football?
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The Rough Road to Berlin
Whereas Japanese media usually described the 1935 Emperor’s Cup and Meiji Shrine tournaments
as “regional competitions,” Korean print media regularly mentioned their double function as
Olympic qualifying events (Olrimp’ik taehoe ch’ukku yesŏn).49 Embarking for Tokyo for the Cup
tournament, KFC head coach Hyŏn Chŏng-ju and several players expressed the gravitas of the
competition with melodramatic rhetoric worthy of kamikaze pilots. Kim Pyŏng-hŭi 金 炳 禧
admitted that “our football world is a baby advancing onto the international stage,” but the team
did not lack for ambition: Yi Hye-bong 李惠逢 and Kang Ki-sun 康基淳 indicated they were
already coveting the Olympian “laurel wreath of victory” (sŭngri ŭi wŏlgye kwan). Anticipating
Orwell’s comment that football is “war minus the shooting” by nearly two decades, fullback Yi
Pong-ho 李奉鎬 stated, “We are soldiers going to the battlefield without weapons.” “I will fight
with redoubled courage,” his teammate Chŏng Yong-su 鄭龍洙 chimed in, “even if it means losing
my life.”50
Six teams competed in the two-day Emperor’s Cup tournament on June 1 and 2, 1935, with
the semi-final and championship matches played on the same day. Having thrashed Nagoya Higher
Commercial School, 6-0, in a late-morning match, KFC defeated Tokyo Bunri in the final on just
two hours’ rest.51 The fact that Keijō nippō, the Japanese-language newspaper in Kyŏngsŏng,
called KFC “our [hometown] football team” (waga shūkyū chīmu) indicated the intra-imperial
affinities football promoted and hinted at the integrationist ethos of naisen ittai.52 By contrast,
football journalist Yamada Gorō 山 田 午 郎 (1894-1958) peevishly griped about the field
conditions, wind, heat, and off-season timing of the tournament. While grudgingly praising KFC
players’ adroit individual technique and ball control, he deemed this individualism “disastrous.”53
A 12-1 goal differential across two matches did not deter his criticism. In hindsight Yamada was
laying the groundwork for a negative assessment of Korean play that would justify preventing
KFC from representing Japan in Berlin.54
KFC responded to such criticism on the pitch five months later at the 8th Annual Meiji
Shrine Games, a multi-sport event. Remarkably, P’yŏngyang FC loaned star forwards Kim Yŏnggŭn and Kim Sŏng-gan 金成汗 (1912-84) to its fiercest rival for the occasion. KFC trounced
Hiroshima’s Gako, 6-2, eked out a close win over Hakodate, then posted clean sheets against
Kansei Gakuin and Keiō’s BRB in the final.55
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Since this championship seemed to settle the matter of who would represent Japan in Berlin,
the Korean press took greater notice of the Meiji Shrine triumph than it had the Cup win.56 Korea’s
two major newspapers, Tong-a ilbo and Chosŏn ilbo, showed little restraint in their headlines,
using the phrases “decisive victory” (kyŏlsŭng), “master battle” (chepaeng chŏnhyang),
“Kyŏngsŏng football supremacy” (Kyŏngch’u usŭng) “easy victory” (kkwaesŭng), “conquest of
the Japanese football world” (Ilbon ch’ukkugye rŭl chŏngbok), and “with overwhelming
superiority, KFC’s final domination.” Perhaps the boldest headline proclaimed, “Strong Opponent
Broken to Dust in Easy Win—Kyŏngsŏng Football Championship—Magnificent All-Kantō [Side
Reduced] to Nothing.”57 Written in Sino-Korean—blending Chinese characters with the han’gŭl
syllabary—these headlines were easily intelligible to Japanese readers who spoke no Korean.
By contrast, despite the likelihood of a substantially Korean team representing Japan in
Berlin, in its December 1935 issue JFA’s magazine Shūkyū (Football, published 1931-41) said
nothing of it. In its January 1936 edition Shūkyū published a ten-page, year-in-review roundtable
discussion on the Tokyo university league, in which KFC’s wins over Bundai and Keiō were not
mentioned once.58
This silence foreshadowed several months of confusion, duplicity, and obfuscation as JFA
maneuvered to avoid the indignity of deputizing a Korean team as Japan’s daihyō. Koreans were
alert to the plot. In mid-December 1935, KFA director Chŏng Mun-gi 鄭文基 (1898-1995)
responded to a report that JFA would select the winner of the December 25 Tōzai match between
Waseda and Kansei universities. Although JFA had not yet officially announced this news, Chŏng
conceded, it would be “absolutely unfair” and an act of “tyranny” to ignore KFC’s spring and
autumn wins. “The Tōzai competition should be used for reference only, equivalent to one-third
of the evaluation criteria at most.”59
As late as March 1936, there still seemed hope: in the Yomiuri column “Voice of the Fans,”
a Korean warned that JFA was throwing away its best shot at a strong debut on the international
football stage by not building its team around Korean players.
In all of Japan, what fans call the Kyŏngsŏng FC has twice achieved dominance; now at
last there is nothing objectionable about its being Japan’s Olympic representative … [I]f a
team was made centering on KFC, mixed with [players from] P’yŏngyang FC, a stronger,
more invincible and dominant squad than a pickup side centered on a student team would
appear … I’m convinced they could return triumphant.60
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Players later claimed that JFA had promised to invite as many as seven Koreans to the spring
training camp.61 But according to a March 11 Asahi report, JFA had stated in February it would
“not make a Korean team the core of the Olympic representation.”62 It expressed interest only in
striker Kim Yŏng-gŭn and midfielder Kim Yong-sik. Initially, KFC forbade them from attending
the tryout.63
Despite initial praise for Korean football cited earlier, some Japanese contended that
Koreans’ style of play did not mesh with theirs. Japanese favored the Scottish “combination game,”
emphasizing short passing and methodical, coordinated teamwork, which they had learned from
Burmese exchange student Kyaw Din (1900-?) in the 1920s. Din had actually written a textbook,
How to Play Association Football (1923), for his Japanese pupils, to which they perhaps adhered
too closely: some regarded their play as too “by the book” (kyōkashoteki) and “lacking in interest”
(omoshiromi ni kakeru).64 Kim Yong-sik himself described Japanese soccer as “inflexible” (yoyū
ga nai).65
By contrast, Koreans played English-style “kick-and-rush” football, initiating quick
counterattacks with long aerial passes from the back line, a style that was exciting to watch but
also sloppy, risking possession by putting the ball up for grabs. Moreover, Koreans played a
rougher, more physical game, emphasizing gegenpressing (the football equivalent of a “full-court
press”) and individual ball skills.66 When it declared Korean footballers “technically inferior” to
justify excluding or limiting them on the Olympic side, JFA directly contradicted the mainstream
assessment in the Japanese press.67 JFA officials and some sportswriters thus tried to make football
strategy, incompatible national styles of play, and Korean technical deficiencies the issue.
Naturally, Koreans were convinced the real problem was ethnic discrimination.68
Another issue in both countries was regional favoritism for Kantō and Kyŏngsŏng players.
Seok Lee emphasizes that Korea’s football world hardly presented a united front: “The issue of
Olympic football trials was, in part, not so much related to national unity as often mingled with
the individual interests of a variety of actors, including football associations, teams, leading lights,
fans, and players.”70 Although a Kyŏngsŏng team had actually done all the winning, P’yŏngyang
officials, players, and fans felt slighted by KFA. For neither the first nor the last time, peninsular
regionalism compromised Korean nationalism. Not that it mattered in the end.
69
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That said, Japan’s Kansai football community was no happier than Korea’s. Waseda’s
throttling of Kansei Gakuin, 12-2, in the December 1935 Tōzai competition became a pretext for
favoring its players heavily for the Olympic side. In a livid statement, the Kansai affiliate alleged
that the JFA board of directors had dismissed the recommendations of a selection committee
consisting of three Kantō and two Kansai representatives, disbanded it, and then appointed an allKantō coaching staff. Kansai officials threatened to “vigorously push for reform of JFA.”71 Hence,
the only Kansai footballers who accepted invitations to training camp were those currently playing
for Kantō universities.72
In response to the controversy, on the eve of the Berlin Olympiad JFA published a detailed
timeline of the yearlong selection process in Shūkyū and in the official Olympic report compiled
by the Japan Sports Association.73 There are clear disparities between contemporaneous press
reports and the timeline, suggesting either substantial retroactive tinkering or, at best, confusion:
•

•

•

May 26, 1935: JFA decided to participate in the 11th Olympiad, set up a committee to select
players for a daihyō side, and solicited nominations of players from each regional affiliate.
There is no mention that the upcoming Emperor’s Cup—a mere five days away—would
be an Olympic audition for “aspiring teams,” even though Japanese and Korean
newspapers and the April issue of Shūkyū all reported it as such at the time.
September 15, 1935: Since the “current state of Japan’s football world” made a national
“pick-up” side “inappropriate,” JFA would build one around a core from the strongest
established team during the regular season. In the event no such team rose to the occasion,
JFA would assemble a squad from nominees sent from each of the regional associations.
JFA also would take the results of the Emperor’s Cup, Meiji Shrine, Tokyo University
League, and Tōzai competitions into account; if there were no clear winner, there would
be a playoff match (between whom?). Again, earlier press accounts said nothing about the
Tokyo University League and Tōzai competitions being part of the Olympic audition
process. The timeline suggests multiple factors going into the decision that were not
previously reported, giving the impression that JFA was both flexible and discretionary in
assembling an Olympic side—but again, this appears to be a retroactive characterization.
Note also that this “decision” predates the Meiji Shrine Tournament by almost two months;
and that even if JFA’s selection committee did make such a decision on September 15, one
could reasonably assume that KFC’s victories in the Cup and Shrine tournaments qualified
it as “hands down the strongest team.” Later, JFA officials nitpicked KFC’s performance
in its win over Keiō BRB in the Meiji Shrine final.74 Its three victories in the earlier rounds
and a total 15-3 goal differential in the tournament—after an exhausting boat and rail
journey from Korea and four consecutive days of competition—apparently counted for
nothing to the selection committee.
November 3, 1935, the very day of KFC’s Meiji Shrine win: The selection committee
decided that no team stood out in the previous competitions. JFA was interested in “only
two or three individual players from the champion Korean team,” naming the two Kims
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•

•

specifically (Korean football cognoscenti regarded overlooking Kim Sŏng-gan as
particularly foolish).75
December 15, 1935: The selection committee stated that Waseda had the best team and
would form the core of the Olympic side. However, Kansai representative Saitō Saizō 斎
藤才三 (1908-2004) insisted that there were excellent players in his region and urged the
committee to scout them in the upcoming Tōzai match (actually, it did the committee no
favors to admit in the timeline that it already favored Waseda players before Tōzai).
Furthermore, December 15 was the same day that Tong-a published KFA director Chŏng
Mun-gi’s angry response to a newspaper report that the Tōzai result would determine the
Olympic roster. Clearly, the news was circulating before JFA’s selection committee
meeting. Yet testimonies by Korean footballers indicate they still thought KFC would be
the core of the Olympic squad up until the preliminary lineup for the spring training camp
was announced in March 1936.
March 9, 1936: JFA officials accepted the recommended lineup on which the selection
committee decided at its January 19 meeting. The March 7 Yomiuri editorial indicates that
some observers, at least, believed the idea of a daihyō side composed primarily of KFC—
and possibly some P’yŏngyang—players was still a possibility.

•
Thus, JFA’s timetable comes across as disingenuous at best; the most charitable characterization
of the entire episode is that the organization sent numerous mixed signals to both Kansai and
Korean football officials and players.

Surely ethnic discrimination and Japanese nationalism were factors in JFA’s refusal to
build a national side around a KFC lineup. As in other areas, Koreans were “Japanese” when it
was convenient, but not enough so to represent the Empire on the world stage. Yet regionalism
figured into JFA’s decision, as well: in fact, since two Koreans were on the squad, Kansai wound
up being the biggest loser. Aside from the Kims, the twenty-three Japanese who showed up in
Tokyo for tryouts on April 23, 1936, were all from eastern schools; twelve were current or alumni
players from Waseda alone. The final Olympic roster of seventeen players included ten from
Waseda, as was head coach Suzuki Shigeyoshi 鈴木重義 (1902-71). By making Waseda the
Olympic squad’s core, in effect JFA inadvertently, if disingenuously, did honor its initial pledge
to send established “aspiring teams” to Berlin.
The Korean Football War
Koreans debated the very propriety of their players representing Japan in Berlin at all, given JFA
duplicity. Some observers believed it would be a self-indulgent affront to national pride. An
anonymous essay in Tong-a ilbo denounced “players only seeking personal honor with reckless
bravado and a superiority complex.” Would the two Kims whose names were still in the running
(Yŏng-gŭn and Yong-sik) join the Japanese side despite the objections of their clubs? “If so, it is
a disgrace to Korea and reveals the disadvantage of the Korean sports community, in which players
only focus on physical ability and lack the team spirit needed for social life and being true
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sportsmen.”76 Prominent nationalist intellectual Yŏ Unhyŏng 呂運亨 (1886-1947), chair of the
Korean Sports Council and president of KFA, admonished the Kims to decline the offer and
boycott the training camp.77
Conversely, many in the Korean football community saw the Berlin Olympiad as an
unprecedented opportunity both to show the world how good its players were and to improve their
own tactics and skills by observing firsthand and competing against top-notch Europeans. The
chosen Kims themselves were anguished by attacks on their patriotism, but since they were
legendarily dedicated to self-improvement as footballers, they understandably wanted to take the
world stage, both to demonstrate their abilities and to learn from the best in the world. Their
identities as practitioners of a challenging craft and as Korean patriots appeared to be in conflict,
although in their own minds this likely seemed fatuous. If we take them at their word, their
individual accomplishments accrued to all Koreans.
Although he wowed his prospective teammates at the first training camp in March, Kim
Yŏng-gŭn did not last long. He repeatedly clashed with assistant coach Takenokoshi Shigemaru
竹腰重丸 (1906-80). In a practice match against an amateur English side, Japan was down 0-2 at
the half. Kim Yŏng-gŭn, accustomed to a leadership role on the pitch, defied Takenokoshi’s game
plan and scored six goals, singlehandedly taking Japan to a 6-3 victory. Infuriated by Kim’s
insubordination, Takenokoshi upbraided him in the locker room. Convinced he was being scolded
only because he was Korean, Kim decided to rejoin his hometown team P’yŏngyang FC for some
April friendlies in Tianjin, and then rejected JFA’s offer to take him back. Considering how
important Olympic dreams are to most athletes, Kim Yŏng-gŭn’s decision to forsake his for a few
stake-less matches in China was remarkable. It also effectively ended his football career.78
And then there was one. Kim Yong-sik was a competitive, pugnacious personality so
devoted to his craft and so attentive to his fitness that he spurned both women and alcohol. Perhaps
because of soccer’s popularity and his own celebrity, Kim took much heat from Koreans who
accused him of betraying his nation for his own personal ambitions. He persistently articulated his
aims as collective, telling Shūkyū that he was happy to have an opportunity to “make the whole
world recognize our football.”79
To whom did “our” refer? As the very embodiment of liminal imperial subjecthood, Kim
Yong-sik could have been referring specifically to Korea, Japan, the naisen ittai union, or East
Asia in general, since Japan and China’s Berlin appearance was the region’s debut in international
football. Player testimony indicates that Kim earned the genuine respect of his Japanese teammates
through his prowess, leadership, and refusal to countenance discrimination. “Even though Kim
was mild-mannered, he had fight in him,” his teammate Horie Tadao 堀江忠男 (1913-2003)
recalled. “He was active in the Sweden match. He didn’t show any resentment about
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discrimination.” 80 Kim’s continual participation on the Japan national side into the 1940s,
alongside increasing numbers of Koreans, indicates his comfort and loyalty to the team.
But by all accounts, he was also a patriot, boasting that Koreans had “completely conquered
the Japanese football community.” Kim regretted leaving his Korean compadres behind, but
responded to accusations of selfishness by saying, “I am going only to learn skills and tactics from
countries that are advanced in football.”81 Abused and admired by fellow Koreans, respected and
resented by Japanese, and representing both his homeland and its oppressor on a conspicuous
international stage, Kim Yong-sik bore to Berlin the pressure of overlapping identities and
conflicting expectations.
There indeed seem to have been few obvious signs of ethnic disharmony among players.
Ninomiya Hirokazu 二宮洋一 (1917-2000) recalled that Japanese and Korean players “got on
well” (naka yoku yatte imashita). “At that time, no matter what, Japanese would say, ‘That’s
Korea,’ but we wouldn’t say that; we called them by their team names, like, ‘That’s Posŏng
Vocational, Yŏnhŭi Vocational, or Hamhŭng.’” That is, Japanese footballers thought of Koreans
and their teams as individual people and units rather than as undistinguished ethnotypes. Yi Yuhyŏng described camaraderie among the players: “Because we didn’t have much money, we
always took care to split costs the Japanese way. But on days we didn’t practice, we listened to
music and went to see movies together. As athletes we all loved sports and there was no
discrimination.”82
The “Berlin Miracle”
The 11th Olympiad was an example of Nazi mastery of “mass pageantry” and “contrived festivity”
designed to persuade Germans and non-Germans alike of the competence, viability, and validity
of the new Reich.83 The world was meant to acknowledge and wonder at Germany’s postwar
resurrection as reflected in facilities, festivities, and Aryan athleticism. Since racial supremacy was
no less fundamental to Japanese imperial fascism than it was to Nazism, there is something vaguely
poetic in the fact that Korean athletes representing Japan—marathoners Son and Nam, and
footballer Kim—performed with such distinction at the same Olympiad in which Jesse Owens won
four gold medals, demolishing Nazi tenets.
To prepare for the Games, the Japan daihyō side was scheduled to play three matches
against Berlin soccer clubs, Wacker 04, Minerva 93, and Blau-Weiß 1890 Berlin. It was a
transformative moment for Japanese football: it was not only the first time an East Asian side
played on European soil, but also an opportunity to adapt to the latest tactical innovations in the
sport. In response to FIFA’s 1925 amendment of the offside rule, European coaches had begun
tinkering with the conventional 2-3-5 “Cambridge pyramid” formation (two defenders, three
midfielders, and five forwards) to fortify defenses and deploy offside traps. At the time, Arsenal
coach Herbert Chapman’s (1878-1934) W-M (3-2-2-3) formation (with a center midfielder pulled
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back as a third defender) was catching on in German soccer.84 Suzuki and Takenokoshi observed
the W-M in their embarrassing 1-3 loss to “second-tier” Wacker and worked to implement it in
forthcoming matches.85 After a week of training, Japan looked stronger in its match against a firstrate Minerva squad, scoring two goals within the first ten minutes. Although Minerva responded
with four before halftime, the reconfigured Japanese defense regrouped to hold the Germans
scoreless in the second half.
Having been benched in the Wacker and Minerva matches, Kim put his coaches on notice
that he expected to play. The evening before the Blau-Weiß match, he accused Takenokoshi of
discrimination and declared that if he was not in the starting lineup he would go home. 86
Takenokoshi’s capitulation was wise: in its report on the Blau-Weiß contest (a respectably close
2-3 loss), Die Fußball-Woche (Football Weekly) named Kim as one of Japan’s strongest players.87
He started at left midfield—occasionally moving to center—in the next three matches until Japan
was eliminated.
Kim’s shining moment came in the “miraculous” come-from-behind victory over a heavily
favored (and much taller) Sweden side on August 4 at Stadion am Gesundbrunnen. Eric Persson
(1909-89) netted twice in the first half, but Japan’s team play gradually coalesced, shutting down
Sweden’s offense with its new three-back defense and Sano Rihei’s 佐野理平 (1912-92) stalwart
goalkeeping. Following goals by Kamo Shōgo 加茂正五 (1915-77) and Ukon Tokutarō 右近徳
太郎 (1913-44), with five minutes left in regulation Kim broke through the Sweden back line on
the left wing and centered the ball to forward Matsunaga Akira 松永行 (1914-43), who nudged it
to the far post past goalkeeper Sven Bergqvist (1914-96).88 For the first time, an Asian side had
defeated Europeans in international soccer; and Kim Yong-sik had accomplished his goal, earning
“recognition for our football” on the world stage. Tong-a ilbo crowed, “Mr. Kim Yong-sik fights
bravely!”89
Any delusions of grandeur Japan’s footballers might have carried after defeating the
“Nordic giants” quickly and decisively evaporated in a sobering 0-8 loss to Vittorio Pozzo’s
mighty Italian side, eventual winner of the gold medal. For our purposes, what is important to note
is that after 1936 Japanese soccer cognoscenti realized their fortunes in international competition
were best served by casting their net across the Tsushima Straits to ensnare talented players from
the Korean peninsula. Yi Yu-hyŏng, who joined the Japan national team in 1937, recollected
Takenokoshi saying, “If we had brought more Koreans to Berlin, I think we might’ve done a little
better,” a notable admission from the coach whom some Koreans accused of prejudice.90 With
Tokyo slated to host the 1940 Olympiad, JFA wanted to make an even stronger showing than in
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Berlin. As Korean teams continued to compile a favorable win-loss record (with a sizable total
goal differential) in competitions against Japanese, JFA could not ignore the benefits to its daihyō
team of poaching more Koreans. Moreover, as naisen ittai and kōminka (“imperialization”)
became core tenets of colonial policy, recruiting Koreans had propaganda value. Thus, between
1936 and 1942 thirty-eight Koreans played for Japan.91
Stoppage Time
After Berlin, Japanese and Koreans continued to play alongside each other for the national side,
university teams, and Korea-based Japanese company squads. Kim Yong-sik even briefly attended
Waseda and played for its football team. 92 In 1938 and 1940, Tōzai became a “tri-regional”
competition, with the colony added as a third region. Nevertheless, the integration of Koreans into
Japanese football facilitated more competition against Japanese through participation at all levels
in JFA-sponsored tournaments, which continued until well into the Pacific War. Still, football
remained a potent vehicle for nationalism. Notwithstanding the genuine goodwill that football
could generate between colonized and colonizer exhibited on the daihyō team, national enmity
took center stage after 1936.
Even as their rivalry intensified, Japanese frequently praised Korean football prowess.
Comments by players, coaches, and in the press regularly acknowledged Koreans’ strength, fitness,
speed, stamina, technical skill, strategy, firepower, and fighting spirit, as well as their physical size
(“All the Korean footballers were big”).93 A report on Chungdong Middle School’s triumph in the
11th Meiji Shrine Games stated that one “would not think this is a middle-school team,” but rather
a college side. 94 The fitness regimen of Hamhŭng Smeltery became famous: players started
practice at 6:00 AM, worked from 9:00-2:00, then practiced again until sunset, climbing mountains
and jogging on sandy beaches. “We trained with the plan of fighting for 180 minutes,” coach Yi
Yu-hyŏng recounted.95
In a 1939 Shūkyū feature entitled “Tomorrow’s Peninsular Footballer,” Meiji University’s
Hondō Morio 本堂守男 suggested that Korean “ball mates” (kyūyū) should be integrated into
metropolitan teams because they had “an innate interest” in the game. Regarding the “theory that
Korean players value only individual technique and think little of group cooperation,” he retorted
that Koreans on his university team had helped improve its cooperative play. Individual technique
was important, but this did detract from Koreans’ “spiritual power” when playing as a team. “I
enjoy football that fully [includes] Korean compatriots into the football of Great Japan.”96
Such praise notwithstanding, three specific incidents demonstrated persistent inequality,
discrimination, duplicity, and bitter resentment. The first of these occurred at the 9th Meiji Shrine
Games on November 3, 1937, when Ch’ŏngjin FC from northeastern Hamgyŏng province faced
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Waseda WMW (White Maroon White, the alumni team) in the championship match.97 Ch’ŏngjin
fell 1-2 after two goals were nullified by offside calls. Vigorously disputing referees’ decisions
was certainly a trait of Korean football culture, but Ch’ŏngjin found these particularly egregious.
The game was suspended temporarily while the Koreans argued their point; the official KFA
history contends that they abandoned their protest only so that Korean soccer would not get a bad
reputation. To be fair, Japanese observers were not entirely unsympathetic. Although he found
complaints about the referee’s decision to be “disgusting,” Shūkyū’s correspondent called
Ch’ŏngjin’s loss “regrettable” and praised the referee and Ch’ŏngjin coach (and Korean sport
legend) Yi Yŏng-min 李榮敏 (1905-54) for settling things down. Asahi and Tong-a both reported
that the Japanese spectators appreciated Ch’ŏngjin’s sportsmanship and “warrior-like
demeanor”—but Tong-a added that the crowd, too, was “dumbfounded” by the official’s
“incomprehensible verdict” (simpan ŭi aemaehan sŏn’go).98
The second controversial incident occurred on June 10, 1939. In the 19th Emperor’s Cup
semifinal, All-Posŏng was down 1-2 to Waseda with one minute remaining in regulation, when
Kim Yong-sik fired a twenty-meter shot into the back of the net, tying the match. Neither side
scored in extra time, so each team captain drew an envelope in a lottery to determine who would
advance to the championship match.99 According to Kim, the Waseda captain opened his envelope,
made a strange face, then turned his back, without revealing its contents. Kim opened his envelope
and saw the character for “loss” (hai/p’ae). Waseda was declared the winner. Unable to verify for
himself that the Waseda envelope’s contents said “win” (shō/sŭng), and having observed his
counterpart’s initial reaction, Kim suspected that both envelopes said “loss” and that the lottery
had been rigged against Posŏng. He later said that not demanding to see Waseda’s envelope on the
spot was one of the greatest regrets of his life.100 The incident was particularly bitter because Kim
had played alongside Waseda players for several years.
The third incident occurred when P’yŏngyang Nikkoku triumphed over another company
team, Hitachi Ibaraki, to take the title in the 12th Meiji Shrine tournament on November 2, 1941.
A sizeable contingent of Korean college students residing in Tokyo attended the match. Down 12 in the second half, Nikkoku came from behind, tying the match then scoring the winning goal
with five minutes remaining in regulation. When the final whistle blew, Korean students leapt from
the stands and rushed onto the pitch, lifting the victorious footballers in the air and celebrating in
a manner that Japanese found obnoxious. Spectators, the press, and JFA officials were enraged
that Koreans behaved in such a manner in the “sacred” precincts of the shrine to the Meiji Emperor,
whose grandson Prince Takamatsu 高松宮 (1905-87), Emperor Hirohito’s younger brother, was
in attendance with his wife.
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Japan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kōseishō) demanded that KFA apologize for the
incident. How was KFA to control the behavior of Korean students in Japan? Yet, having “revealed
its incompetence,” as Keijō nippō put it, KFA complied. President Ko Wŏn-hun 高元勲 (18811950) formally apologized to the Governor-General; and before resigning en masse, KFA officials
decided to relinquish Nikkoku’s title and to cancel the upcoming annual peninsular tournament at
the last minute. 101 Soon thereafter KFA was defunct. Any semblance of autonomy in Korean
athletics was eliminated.
KFA’s dissolution did not end competition between Japanese and Koreans but was
nonetheless meaningful.102 From a purely organizational standpoint, the disbandment of KFA was
technically akin to abolishing, say, the Hokkaidō or Kansai regional affiliates in the metropole.
However, by holding KFA accountable for the conduct of Korean exchange students in Tokyo, the
Ministry and JFA marked it as a different beast. KFA represented something more than a region
of Japan: an undesirable quasi-national entity—Korea/Chosŏn/Chōsen—that was not supposed to
exist.
Extra Time
Every football match between Japan and the two Korean states carries the baggage of the history
related here, especially at the highest-level competitions (e.g., Asian Football Confederation Cup,
Olympic, Asiad, and World Cup). To embellish their international profiles, both peninsular
regimes generously invest in football and take glee in defeating their former colonial tormenter.103
“When the former colonized emerges triumphant,” Guy Podoler observes, “the pains of the past
are somewhat mollified, and the colonial period can be fitted into a narrative that is based on a
historical continuum of valor and stamina.”104
Japan and the ROK played their first post-liberation match in a World Cup qualifier in
Tokyo on March 7, 1954, ending with a 5-1 Korean victory. 105 Many former teammates and
opponents faced each other again as coaches and players, but now on an equal footing as citizens
of sovereign nations. President Yi Sŭng-man 李承晩 (Syngman Rhee, 1875-1965) refused to allow
Japanese footballers onto Korean soil. Echoing the colonial-era refrain “if we don’t beat Japan, we
can’t go home,” he ordered his players to win or “drown themselves in the East Sea.”106
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In 1996 FIFA made the unprecedented (and clueless) decision to have Japan and South
Korea co-host the 2002 FIFA World Cup. After years of fierce jockeying against one another, the
two countries only conceded to the arrangement when they recognized that neither would be
granted sole possession. ROK president Kim Yŏng-sam (1927-2015) spun it as “an opportunity to
further solidify friendly relations,” while other Korean commentators described it as a coming-out
party of sorts for the fledgling democracy.107
Considering the logistical problems, ill feelings, and numerous controversies, the
tournament was successful and the South Korean “Reds” advanced as far as the semi-finals, one
match shy of their dream of winning the Cup on Japanese soil. Japanese fans rooted
enthusiastically for their hosting partners but were mystified and hurt that Korean fans did not
reciprocate. Apparently ignorant, misinformed, or oblivious to their shared history, many Japanese
struggled to understand Korean resentment.108
Yet as demonstrated here, Japan-Korea football history cannot be reduced simply to a onedimensional tale of nationalist animosities acted out on the pitch. To be sure, such enmity underlay
every intra-imperial encounter. With no other options for competing internationally, Koreans no
doubt savored the ironic possibility of an Olympic Japan side built from a preassembled core of
peninsular players. Moreover, Koreans threatened to displace the Tokyo-based JFA as the center
of football within the empire: though organizationally on the periphery of Japanese football, in
terms of quality play the peninsula became its center, a fact Japanese cognoscenti could not help
but acknowledge. Koreans unquestionably endured overt discrimination and micro-aggressions,
as evident in the Olympic selection process and the three episodes described above. Then, KFA
was dissolved for an incident for which no reasonable person could say it was responsible.
Still, football was one arena, among others, in which Japanese and Koreans were not only
foils but partners, who took East Asian soccer to high-level international play. Within an empire
rhetorically committed to seamless integration, the sport created competing loyalties and complex
identities. Regional antipathies impaired unified nationalist identifications, though without
completely erasing them. Despite hostility from KFA, teammates, and fans, Kim Yong-sik earned
a spot on the Olympic team and was pivotal in the “Berlin miracle.” Japanese realized that they
would perform better internationally if they kept poaching from the peninsula. The football pitch
was meritocratic liminal territory in which players could set aside ethnic differences, thinking of
themselves as compatriots collaborating to improve their individual and collective performance.
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Kirsten Ziomek posits “different degrees” or a spectrum of “subalternity” among colonial
subjects who “had different levels of access to power.” “The location and movement of colonial
subjects affected their relationship to the empire; their position was constantly in flux as they
traveled from the colony to metropole.”109 Korean footballers interacted with Japanese from a
position of demonstrated strength. When their “location and movement” were on the football pitch,
Koreans were either powerful teammates or indomitable adversaries to Japanese. For the better
part of a decade, to take their football to the next level, to the most prestigious international venues,
Japanese and Koreans needed each other. Shoulder to shoulder on the pitch, footballers from both
countries displayed naisen ittai idealism in action.
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